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NOTE
FIRST AND GOAL: HOW THE NFL'S PERSONAL
CONDUCT POLICY COMPLIES WITH FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW
Kelly M. Vaughant
INTRODUCTION
In April 2007, moments after suspending Tennessee Titans
cornerback Adam "Pacman" Jones for the entire 2007 season and the
late Chris Henry, wide receiver for the Cincinnati Bengals, for eight
games, National Football League (NFL) Commissioner Roger Goodell
announced a new league-wide disciplinary policy.' The new policy
aimed to address persistent criminal behavior among NFL players,2 a
pattern that has continued to plague the NFL in the years since Good-
ell announced the policy, most noticeably with the arrest and impris-
onment of star quarterback Michael Vick for federal dog-fighting
charges and the arrest and sentencing of New York Giants wide re-
ceiver Plaxico Burress for a weapons charge.3
Under the NFL's new personal conduct policy (Personal Conduct
Policy or the Policy), Goodell possesses full authority to impose a vari-
ety of penalties on players, ranging from monetary fines to "banish-
ment from the League" for various offenses, including (but not
limited to) illegal activity.4 The NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement
(the Collective Bargaining Agreement or the Agreement), the prod-
uct of a lengthy collective bargaining process between the National
t B.A., Hamilton College, 2006;J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2011; Notes Edi-
tor, Volume 96, Cornell Law Review. I am grateful to Professor George Hay and Professor
William Briggs for their help with this topic. I would also like to thank the Cornell Law
Review, especially Monica Arduini, Lilian Balasanian, and Charlie Brown for their hard
work and helpful suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents and
siblings for their constant love and support.
I See Judy Battista, N.FL. Assesses Lengthy Bans for Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2007, at D1; Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, ESPN (May 17, 2007, 4:27
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015.
2 See Battista, supra note 1 (referring to "Goodell's law-and-order campaign").
3 SeeJohn Eligon, Burress Will Receive 2-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009,
at A23; Jerry Markon & Mark Maske, Vick Gets 23-Month Sentence forDogfighting, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2007, at Al.
4 See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2008 PERSONAL CONDUcr POLICY 1-3 (2007)
[hereinafter NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY], available at http://images.nflplayers.com/
mediaResources/images/oldlmages/fck/NFL%20Persona1%20Conduct%2OPolicy%20
2008.pdf%2OPersonal%2OConduct%2OPolicy%202008.pdf.
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Football League Players Association (NFLPA or Players' Association)
and the NFL,5 typically sets forth the policies affecting NFL players.
Goodell, nevertheless, imposed the NFL Personal Conduct Policy
upon the NFL teams unilaterally without amending the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement through a formal negotiation process and agree-
ment between the parties.6 However, the late executive director of
the NFLPA, Gene Upshaw, publicly supported the policy, and Goodell
also consulted with a small panel of NFL players prior to the
announcement.7
Although encouraging professional athletes to act responsibly on
and off the field is undoubtedly a laudable goal, it is unclear whether
the antitrust exemption that courts afford to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement would apply to the Personal Conduct Policy as well be-
cause the parties did not amend the Collective Bargaining Agreement
to incorporate the Personal Conduct Policy.8 Absent an applicable
exemption from the antitrust laws, the NFL would have to demon-
strate that the procompetitive effects of the Personal Conduct Policy
outweigh its anticompetitive effects to avoid antitrust liability.9 Cir-
cuits disagree, however, on when to apply the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption (the traditional exemption for collectively bargained
agreements), and the Supreme Court has not expressed clear bounda-
ries for the exemption's application.10 Due to this lack of clarity in
5 See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
2006-2012 (2006) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT].
6 See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH.
U. L. REv. 631, 632 (2009).
7 See id.; Goodell Unveils New Conduct Policy, ESPN (Apr. 11, 2007, 12:56 AM), http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832098 (suggesting that Goodell and Upshaw dis-
cussed the Personal Conduct Policy with a panel of players before announcing it).
8 National labor policy favors free and private collective bargaining. Courts nation-
wide have consistently determined that antitrust law is inappropriate to resolve labor dis-
putes and implied an exemption from the antitrust laws for collectively bargained labor
agreements. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1996); Clarett v. NFL,
369 F.3d 124, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NFL's eligibility rules are exempt
from the antitrust laws because allowing antitrust scrutiny would subvert the collective bar-
gaining process).
9 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
10 Compare Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138-43 (applying an open-ended test to determine
whether antitrust scrutiny would "'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor pol-
icy,'" considering whether the policy at issue is a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing, who the policy affects, and whether the policy resulted from collective bargaining, but
finding no part dispositive (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)), with
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the nonstatutory labor
exemption only applies where "the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to
the collective bargaining relationship," "the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining," and "the agreement sought to be exempted is
the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining"). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit and United States District Court for the District of Columbia have also
applied the Mackey test in professional sport disputes. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600
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courts' application of the exemption, whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption applies to the Personal Conduct Policy may depend on
which court eventually hears a challenge to the Personal Conduct
Policy.
From a strictly antitrust perspective, collective action among buy-
ers (in this case, the teams) to prevent a seller (the player) from pro-
viding services typically constitutes a group boycott," an action that
the Supreme Court has traditionally found per se illegal. 12 However,
because the NFL is a sports league structured as a joint venture, a
court would likely not subject the organization to the per se rule.13
Rather, a court would likely analyze the Personal Conduct Policy
under a rule of reason analysis, where the plaintiff would have to
prove an anticompetitive effect and the NFL would have the opportu-
nity to present business reasons to justify the Personal Conduct Pol-
icy's necessity.14
This Note will argue that the Personal Conduct Policy would pass
antitrust scrutiny, regardless of whether the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption applied, because the NFL could present a legitimate business
justification for imposing the Personal Conduct Policy collectively.
Part I will provide a brief overview of the NFL, the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, and the Personal Conduct Policy. Part II will briefly
discuss applicable antitrust and labor laws. Part III will demonstrate
that, even assuming the nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply,
the Personal Conduct Policy does not run afoul of antitrust law.
I
THE WORLD OF PROFESsIoNAL FOOTBALL
A. The National Football League
Established in 1920, the NFL is structured as an "unincorporated
association comprised of member clubs which own and operate pro-
F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C.
1986).
11 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959) (finding
that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a group boycott where complaint alleged that defend-
ants agreed among themselves not to sell goods to the plaintiff).
12 See, e.g., id. at 211-12 ("Group boycotts ... have long been held to be in the forbid-
den category.").
13 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) ("[I]t
would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. . . . [T]his case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.").
14 See id. at 113 (analyzing the NCAA television plan under the rule of reason); Nat'l
Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978) (describing the proof
that plaintiffs would need to present in light of the basic policy behind the Sherman Anti-
trust Act).
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fessional football teams."15 Currently, the NFL operates with thirty-
two independently owned teams located across the United States.16
The NFL is the only elite employer of professional football players in
the United States and enjoys monopoly power over the professional
football market.17 The NFL performs various administrative functions
for the member teams, including organizing and scheduling games
between the teams and promulgating league-wide rules.' 8 A league
constitution and set of bylaws governs the activities of the NFL and the
member teams.' 9 As Commissioner of the NFL, Roger Goodell acts as
the League's chief executive officer and possesses wide-ranging over-
sight responsibility. 20
Originally, individual club owners unilaterally controlled the
NFL's operations; however, in 1968, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) certified the NFLPA as a labor organization under the
Labor-Management Relations Act, recognizing it as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all NFL players.2' As a result of this relation-
ship, the NFLPA and NFL are required to collectively bargain
regarding employment terms such as wages, hours of employment,
and working conditions. 22 Due to the NFL players' collective decision
to unionize and designate the NFLPA as their exclusive bargaining
agent, labor law prevents a player from negotiating individually with a
particular team regarding the terms and conditions of his employ-
ment.2 3 Additionally, any agreement that the NFLPA and the NFL
teams reach through the collective bargaining process overrides any
conflicting terms in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. 24 The most re-
cent Collective Bargaining Agreement went into effect in 2006.25 The
NFLPA and the NFL are currently in the midst of negotiating a new
15 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
16 See MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA's GAME: THE Epic STORY OF How PRO FOOT-
BALL CAPTURED A NATION xvi-xix (2004); NFL, NFL TEAMs, http://www.nfl.com/teams
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
17 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.; see also CONsTITUTION AND BYLAws OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art.
VIII (2006) (describing the duties of the NFL Commissioner).
21 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2008) (defining the term
"labor organization"); id. § 159(a) (regulating "exclusive representatives" and "employees'
adjustment of grievances directly with employer").
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
23 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) ("[National labor]
policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations
with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the
interests of all employees."); Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004)
("[P]rospective players no longer have the right to negotiate directly with the NFL teams
over the terms and conditions of their employment.").
24 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 634.
25 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5.
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agreement that will come into effect after the 2010 season, as the cur-
rent Agreement expires in March 2011.26
B. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The current Collective Bargaining Agreement does not explicitly
reference the Personal Conduct Policy. Additionally, the Agreement
specifically states that no provisions of the Agreement "may be
changed, altered or amended other than by a written agreement."27
The NFLPA and NFL did not, however, enter into a written agree-
ment regarding the Personal Conduct Policy. Rather, Goodell unilat-
erally imposed the Personal Conduct Policy as a regulation on the
NFL teams collectively. 28 Although Article XI of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement does address Commissioner Discipline, even not-
ing that the "Commissioner's disciplinary action will preclude or
supersede disciplinary action by any Club for the same act or con-
duct,"2 9 the Agreement does not address the same types of behavior
that the Personal Conduct Policy concerns.30 Additionally, the NFL
Player Contract-attached as an appendix to the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement-discusses discipline by the Commissioner but focuses
on behavior such as gambling or steroid use; it does not contemplate
discipline for violent behavior.31 Consequently, it is unclear whether
26 Id. at 240 (providing that either the NFLPA or the league may terminate the 2010
and 2011 capped years by providing notice to the other party by November 8, 2008). In
2008, the team owners opted out of extending the 2006 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
See Goodell Sees No 2010 Cap, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 4, 2009, at 9. As a result, salaries for the
2010 season are not subject to a salary cap. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra
note 5, at 7, 240 (defining "Final League Year" to mean the final year of the Agreement, as
well as to always mean an "Uncapped Year" in which the salary cap is not in effect, and
specifying that if either the NFLPA or the league provides notice by November 8, 2008, the
2010 League Year will be the Final League Year). If the parties do not reach an agreement
by March, 2011, many expect that a lock-out will occur during the 2011 season. See NFL
Union Head: Owners Set For No Football in 2011, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM (Oct.5, 2010, 5:51
PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/nfl/10/05/owners.2011.ap/in-
dex.html?eref=sircrc. There has been minimal public discussion of incorporating the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy into the new agreement. See Goodell Sees No 2010 Cap, supra; Dan
Graziano, NFL Players Seek Role in Discipline Matters as CBA Negotiations Resume, FANHOUSE
(July 13, 2009, 4:25 PM), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/07/13/nfl-players-to-seek-role-in-
discipline-matters-as-cba-negotiatio.
27 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 235.
28 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
29 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 35.
30 Compare id. at 34 (discussing the imposition of fines and suspensions for conduct
on the playing field), with NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT Poucy, supra note 4, at 1-2 (referring
to disciplinary measures for criminal offenses).
31 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 253 ("Player therefore ac-
knowledges his awareness that if he accepts a bribe or agrees to throw or fix an NFL game;
fails to promptly report a bribe offer or an attempt to throw or fix an NFL game; bets on an
NFL game; knowingly associates with gamblers or gambling activity; uses or provides other
players with stimulants or other drugs for the purpose of attempting to enhance on-field
performance; or is guilty of any other form of conduct reasonably judged by the League
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a court would incorporate the Personal Conduct Policy into the Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement and then apply the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the Personal Conduct Policy as a part of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
C. The Personal Conduct Policy
The most unique aspect of the Personal Conduct Policy is the
breadth of activities to which the Policy applies. The Personal Con-
duct Policy is the NFL's latest attempt to control NFL players' off-the-
field conduct, a process that began in 1998 when the NFL instituted a
Violent Crime Policy allowing the Commissioner to suspend and pos-
sibly fine any athlete charged with a violent crime.32 In 2000,
prompted by negative publicity resulting from several crimes that in-
volved NFL players, the NFL superseded the Violent Crime Policy with
a new personal conduct policy that prohibited a wide variety of violent
behavior and allowed punishment at the Commissioner's discretion.33
The 2008 Personal Conduct Policy strengthened the earlier con-
duct policy by allowing longer suspensions and the possibility of ban-
ishment and by giving the Commissioner the ability to suspend a
player for behavior that does not result in a criminal conviction or
even criminal charges.34 Additionally, the Personal Conduct Policy
expanded its applicability beyond the players to include "all coaches;
all game officials; all full-time employees of the NFL, NFL clubs, and
all NFL-related entities."35 Finally, the Policy encourages NFL clubs to
communicate the terms of the Policy to independent contractors and
Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football, the Commissioner
will have the right ... to fine Player in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a period
certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this contract.").
32 See Sean Bukowski, Rag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAc. 106, 110 (2001).
33 See D. Orlando Ledbetter, NFL Pins Hopes on Conduct Policy to Deter Bad Behavior,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 24, 2000, at 2C.
34 See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 4, at I (noting that "the standard of
conduct for persons employed in the NFL is considerably higher" than refraining from
criminal activity and that "[i]t is not enough simply to avoid being found guilty of a crime.
Instead, ... employee[s] of the NFL .. . [and] member club[s] . . . are held to a higher
standard and expected to conduct [themselves] in a way that is responsible, promotes the
values upon which the League is based, and is lawful"). In late April 2010, Goodell sus-
pended Steelers quarterback Ben Roethlisberger for violating the Personal Conduct Policy
despite the fact that prosecutors declined to charge Roethlisberger after a woman accused
him of sexual assault. See Michael David Smith, Ben Roethlisberger Suspended Six Games for
Violating Personal Conduct Policy, FANHOUSE (Apr. 21, 2010, 10:31 AM), http://
nfl.fanhouse.com/2010/04/21/report-ben-roethlisberger-will-be-suspended-4-6-games.
The Personal Conduct Policy also goes far beyond the type of conduct that typical player
contracts prohibit. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 253 (citing
gambling and the use of performance-enhancing drugs as conduct that may prompt disci-
plinary action).
3 See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLIcY, supra note 4, at 3; see also Ken Murray, Teams
Choose To Be Pickier; New Policy Might Steer NFL Clubs Away from Troublemakers, BALT. SUN, Apr.
[Vol. 96:609614
FIRST AND GOAL
consultants and "to make clear that violations of this policy will be
grounds for terminating a business relationship."3 6
The NFLPA and the NFL did not collectively bargain over the
terms of the Personal Conduct Policy.3 7 In fact, the NFL did not
adopt the Personal Conduct Policy after any formal bargaining pro-
cess, and the NFLPA never formally signed the Policy to indicate their
agreement to its terms.38 Despite the fact that then-NFLPA executive
director, Gene Upshaw, publicly voiced support for the Personal Con-
duct Policy and that Goodell reportedly discussed the Policy with a
panel of players,39 the Policy is not necessarily legally binding upon
the NFL clubs. 4 0
II
ANTrTRuST LAW AND LABOR LAw: THE BASICS
A. Antitrust Law
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act declares that " [e]very con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal."4 ' Section
1 applies to labor markets as well as to product markets. 4 2 It does not
prohibit every contract in restraint of trade but only those contracts
that unreasonably restrain trade or commerce. 43 Consequently, to
properly assert an antitrust claim under § 1, a plaintiff must demon-
strate anticompetitive harm that results from the agreement. 4 4 Addi-
28, 2007, at IC (discussing how different teams deal with the possibility of disciplinary
issues when researching and choosing which players to draft).
36 See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 4, at 3.
37 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 638 (explaining that there is no compelling argu-
ment that the Collective Bargaining Agreement's disciplinary provisions were intended to
address off-the-field conduct and that the Personal Conduct Policy is not a legally binding
amendment to the Collective Bargaining Agreement because the NFLPA did not agree to
the terms of the Policy or sign it).
39 See Nancy Gay, judgment Day: Commissioner Puts Foot Down, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11,
2007, at DI; Goodell Unveils New Conduct Policy, supra note 7.
40 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 638.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
42 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (noting
that the respondents' boycott clearly constituted a restraint of trade within the meaning of
the Sherman Act); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (establishing that profes-
sional football is subject to the antitrust laws).
43 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) ("[1It was
intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law . . . in
dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute[ ] was intended to be the
measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had
or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided.").
44 See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d
537, 542 (2d Cir. 1993) ("If a § 1 plaintiff establishes the existence of an illegal contract or
combination, it must then proceed to demonstrate that the agreement constituted an un-
reasonable restraint of trade either per se or under the rule of reason.").
2011] 615
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tionally, a contract must affect interstate commerce and must be an
agreement between separate entities for the Sherman Act to apply.4 5
In certain instances, however, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that particular conduct is so harmful that a court may presume
an anticompetitive effect once the plaintiff demonstrates the conduct
has occurred. In those instances, the Supreme Court has held the
conduct to be per se illegal. 4 6 Group refusal to deal, also known as a
boycott, is typically per se illegal; therefore, if a plaintiff can demon-
strate that defendants acted collectively rather than independently in
refusing to deal with the plaintiff, the court presumes an anticompeti-
tive effect and does not examine any justifications that the defendants
proffer. 47 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,4 8 how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that the per se rule should not apply to
league sports because "horizontal restraints on competition are essen-
tial if the product is to be available at all." 4 9 The same logic applies to
the NFL because some horizontal restraints between the NFL clubs,
such as the ability to agree on the rules of the game and set a schedule
for the season, are necessary for the product of professional football
to exist at all. Consequently, a court assessing a § 1 case against the
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract. .. in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (finding that an agreement between
a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary does not constitute an "agreement" for
Sherman Act purposes because a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary must
necessarily always have a "'unity of purpose or a common design'" (quoting Am. Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946))). The NFL has never been found to be a
single entity for all purposes, and the Supreme Court recently held that even an agreement
among the NFL teams to jointly license their intellectual property as a single product is not
categorically exempt from § 1 because the teams remain independent actors. See Am. Nee-
dle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212-13 (2010).
46 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219-20 (1940) ("Proof
that there was a conspiracy, that its purpose was to raise prices, and that it caused or con-
tributed to a price rise is proof of the actual consummation or execution of a conspiracy
under § 1 of the Sherman Act").
47 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ('Group
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to
be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were
reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they 'fixed or regu-
lated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in qual-
ity.'" (quoting Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941))).
48 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
49 Id. at 100-01; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that the NFL player draft is "not the type of boycott that traditionally has
been held illegal per se .. . and that the draft, regardless of how it is characterized, should
more appropriately be tested under the rule of reason" because the NFL teams "are not
competitors in any economic sense" and "have not combined to exclude competitors or potential
competitors from [the teams'] level of the market").
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NFL would almost certainly not apply a per se analysis, even if the
conduct alleged would ordinarily warrant use of the per se rule.50
Because the Personal Conduct Policy is an agreement between
separate entities that affects interstate commerce, after a court deter-
mines that the Sherman Act applies, it would likely apply a rule of
reason analysis to assess the legality of the Policy under the antitrust
laws. Under a rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case by demonstrating the harmful anticompetitive effects
of the defendant's conduct.5 ' Common elements necessary to estab-
lish a prima facie case include (1) a showing of market power, (2) net
anticompetitive effects, and (3) anticompetitive harm.52 If a plaintiff
successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to justify its actions by showing a procompetitivejustifi-
cation.53 The defendant's proffered justification must demonstrate
procompetitive economic effects in the sense that the restraint actu-
ally encourages competition within the defined market.54 In enacting
50 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (finding that the NCAA, as a league, "mar-
ket[s] ... competition itself," which "would be completely ineffective if there were no rules
on which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed").
Setting aside the fact that the NFL is a sports league, the per se rule would probably not
apply because the NFL is a joint venture between the individual teams. The Supreme
Court has also refrained from applying the per se rule to a price-fixing arrangement
among a joint venture, likening it to "price setting by a single entity" rather than "a pricing
agreement between competing entities with respect to their competing products." See Tex-
aco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006). This logic, as applied to price-fixing, would
probably extend to boycotts as well.
51 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy com-
petition."); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537,
543 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[The] plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged
action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market; to
prove it has been harmed as an individual competitor will not suffice."); see also 54 AM. JUR.
2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 49 (2009) (noting that proof of
market power is a critical first step to demonstrating anticompetitive harm).
52 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 645.
53 See, e.g., Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543 ("After the plaintiff satisfies its threshold
burden of proof under the rule of reason, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer
evidence of the pro-competitive 'redeeming virtues' of their combination." (quoting 7
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLI-
CATION 1 1502, at 371 (1986))); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAw § 15.02b (3d ed. 2009) ("In a rule of reason case the plaintiff
must first allege and show that the challenged restraint is of a type reasonably calculated to
have anticompetitive effects, ordinarily measured by reduced output in a properly defined
market. Then, and only then, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint
in fact serves a legitimate objective.").
54 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting
that analysis of the justification should be aimed at determining the "competitive signifi-
cance of the restraint"); Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 239-41 (examining the positive
effect on competition as a justification for restraining trade); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188-89
(finding that ajustification can survive rule of reason scrutiny "only if it is demonstrated to
have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or,
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the Sherman Act, Congress made a fundamental policy decision that
favored economic competition within industry.55 Consequently, al-
leged justifications that purport to restrict competition in the public's
interest or for social welfare reasons are inadequate under antitrust
analysis.56
B. Labor Law
A fundamental tension exists between antitrust law, which forbids
any agreement among competitors that unreasonably lessens competi-
tion in any way, and labor law, which condones potentially anticompe-
titive agreements that are conducive to harmony within industry.5 7 In
order for the two doctrines to coexist efficiently, Congress and the
courts have established a framework to determine when antitrust lia-
bility is appropriate and when imposing antitrust liability will do more
harm than good. In this vein, Congress enacted the labor statutes to
prevent the courts from using antitrust law to resolve labor disputes
because antitrust law often provides inappropriate solutions to such
disputes.58 Additionally, allowing the courts to address these issues
would infringe upon the NLRB's authority to oversee labor disputes.59
Antitrust laws are of particularly questionable efficacy in the area
of collective bargaining. Congress has set forth a national labor policy
in favor of free and private collective bargaining to promote workers'
ability to organize their collective power and to designate a represen-
tative to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.6 0
In an effort to enact this policy, Congress delegated rulemaking and
interpretative authority regarding the collective bargaining process to
the NLRB. 6 1 As a result of these policy decisions, the Supreme Court
has implied an exception from the antitrust laws, known as the non-
statutory labor exemption, to accommodate and encourage the collec-
tive bargaining process.62 In doing so, the Court has acknowledged
at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business purposes and to have a
net anticompetitive effect that is insubstantial').
55 See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
56 See id. at 679, 693-95 (rejecting petitioner's justification that a restraint on price
competition was in the public interest as a "frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sher-
man Act"); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (finding that the "procompetitive" effects of balancing
out competition on the playing field cannot be compared to the anticompetitive economic
effect of limiting competition for players' services).
57 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996).
58 See id. at 236.
59 See id. at 236-37.
60 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
61 See id. § 156; Brown, 518 U.S. at 242 ("The labor laws give the Board, not antitrust
courts, primary responsibility for policing the collective-bargaining process.").
62 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 236 ("The Court has implied this exemption from federal
labor statutes, which set forth a national labor policy favoring free and private collective
bargaining; which require good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working condi-
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Congress's intent to ensure that the judiciary does not appropriate the
NLRB's authority to determine reasonable labor practices and to po-
lice the collective bargaining process.63 As a result of this exemption,
courts often hold that terms incorporated into a valid collective bar-
gaining agreement fall outside the scope of antitrust liability." The
issue of whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to the con-
duct in question is therefore a threshold question in an antitrust anal-
ysis where a central issue concerns a collective bargaining
agreement.65 Accordingly, the legality of collective bargaining under
labor law provides it with a safe harbor from antitrust law.
However, not all conduct that is lawful under labor law qualifies
for an exemption from antitrust law. Any antitrust immunity implied
from labor law or policy, including the nonstatutory labor exemption,
only applies if the conduct at issue would normally violate the anti-
trust laws under a traditional antitrust analysis, but "antitrust condem-
nation would undermine or frustrate labor policy."6 6 That particular
conduct is merely lawful under labor law is insufficient to create anti-
trust immunity.67 Additionally, certain subjects of collective bargain-
ing are merely "permissive" rather than "mandatory" due to labor
law's silence on the subject.6 8 Such "permissive" subjects may not war-
rant exemption from the antitrust laws.69 Likewise, conduct that vio-
lates labor law clearly does not advance labor policy; as a result, such
conduct is not immune from antitrust scrutiny.70
tions; and which delegate related rulemaking and interpretive authority to the National
Labor Relations Board. ... " (citations omitted)); Clarettv. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir.
2004) ("[I]n order to accommodate the collective bargaining process, certain concerted
activity among and between labor and employers must be held to be beyond the reach of
the antitrust laws.").
63 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237; Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131.
64 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141 (holding that the NFL and the NFLPA are entitled to
collectively bargain regarding eligibility rules and that the product of this collective bar-
gaining relationship will be "tolerated as a matter of antitrust law"); NBA v. Williams, 45
F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a league may impose the terms of an expired
collective bargaining agreement without running afoul of antitrust law when the parties
had bargained to an impasse).
65 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (overturning the district court's determination of anti-
trust liability because the district court incorrectly determined that the nonstatutory labor
exemption did not apply).
66 See lB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYsIS OF
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 256e (3d ed. 2006); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138
(determining that the test for whether to apply the nonstatutory labor exemption is
whether subjecting the alleged conduct to antitrust scrutiny would "'subvert fundamental
principles of our federal labor policy'" (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir.
1987))).
67 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 66.
68 See id. § 256el.
69 See id.
70 See id. § 256el-e2.
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Despite these guiding principles, the Supreme Court has never
articulated precise boundaries regarding when courts should apply
the nonstatutory labor exemption.7 1 In Local Union 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 72 the Court declined to defer to the
NLRB's expertise but nonetheless held that a marketing-hours restric-
tion was exempt from the Sherman Act by focusing on the fact that
the restriction was closely related to a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.73 In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,74 however, the Supreme
Court applied the exception more broadly, finding that the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption may apply to employers' unilateral actions after
the employers have bargained to an impasse with the employees'
union.7 5 Specifically, the Court held that once the parties have bar-
gained to an impasse yet failed to agree on a new collective bargaining
agreement, the nonstatutory labor exemption may apply to a policy
unilaterally imposed by the NFL teams when the policy implements
the terms of the last-best good faith offer.76 The Court applied the
exception even though the policy that the NFL unilaterally adopted
was not a part of the expired collective bargaining agreement but was
a new agreement among the NFL teams and had never been agreed
upon by the NFLPA.77
As a result of the Supreme Court's reluctance to define precisely
the boundaries of the nonstatutory labor exemption as applied to col-
lective bargaining agreements, various circuit courts have developed
their own tests to determine when to apply the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption to industries that engage in collective bargaining. In Mackey
v. NFL,78 the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the non-
statutory labor exemption could apply to a rule incorporated into the
71 See, e.g., Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131 ("The Supreme Court has never delineated the
precise boundaries of the exemption, and what guidance it has given as to its application
has come mostly in cases in which agreements between an employer and a labor union
were alleged to have injured or eliminated a competitor in the employer's business or
product market.").
72 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
73 See id. at 689-90 ("[T]he issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restric-
tion, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working
conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide,
arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest
of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national
labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We think that it is." (footnote
omitted)).
74 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
75 See id. at 237 ("[W]here its application is necessary to make the statutorily author-
ized collective-bargaining process work as Congress intended, the exemption must apply
both to employers and to employees.").
76 See id. at 238.
77 See id. at 234-35.
78 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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collective bargaining agreement by reference.79 In analyzing the ap-
plicability of the exemption, the court set forth a three-part test, deter-
mining that the nonstatutory labor exemption would apply to an
alleged restraint on trade where (1) "the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship," (2)
"the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining," and (3) "the agreement sought to be ex-
empted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."80
Under the Mackey test, all three conditions must be satisfied for the
exemption to apply.8' The ultimate inquiry, however, turns upon
"'whether the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of preemi-
nence over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the par-
ticular case.' "82 The Sixth Circuit has since adopted the Mackey test,
and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has
also applied it.83
The Second Circuit, however, analyzes the issue of whether to ap-
ply the nonstatutory labor exemption to the Personal Conduct Policy
very differently. In Caldwell v. American Basketball Association,84 the
court found that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied to a for-
mer basketball player's claims that the teams in the American Basket-
ball Association had agreed to blacklist him by refusing to hire him
due to his activities as president of the players' union.85 In its discus-
sion, the court specifically noted that multiemployer bargaining with a
common union does not violate the antitrust laws.86 Additionally, the
court found that the conditions under which an employer may hire or
discharge an employee are mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing, and consequently, the NLRB has primary jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and remedy any breaches of the collective bargaining
79 See id. at 613.
80 Id. at 614.
81 See id. at 615-16 (finding that the nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply to
the Rozelle rule-which governs athletes who leave one team when their contract expires
and join another team-because the rule was not adopted after any type of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining, even though the court already found that the rule affected only
the parties to the agreement sought to be exempted and was a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining).
82 In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n v. FTC, 955 F.2d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Mackey, 543 F.3d at 613).
83 See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[I]t was
proper to apply Mackey's standards; the issue is whether those standards were properly
applied."); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986) ("The parties are
in agreement that [the Mackey] test should govern the Court's analysis . ..
84 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
85 See id. at 527.
86 See id. at 528 ("[E]mployers are allowed to act jointly when they have a collective
bargaining relationship with a common union. This joint conduct is nothing more than
the quite familiar institution of multiemployer bargaining.").
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agreement's conditions.87 Finally, the court found that an industry
decision to institute a mandatory collective bargaining relationship ex-
tinguishes an employee's ability to seek the best individual bargain.88
As a result of these findings, the court determined that the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption must apply to Caldwell's claims because the
claims were essentially "the familiar case of an employee asserting a
discharge based on union activities" and should be properly adjudi-
cated by the NLRB pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act.8 9
More recently, the Second Circuit expressly declined to adopt the
Mackey test and applied a much more open-ended standard (the
Clarett test) to determine whether the nonstatutory labor exemption
applied to the NFL eligibility rules.90 The court looked at a variety of
factors to determine "whether subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to
antitrust scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental principles of our fed-
eral labor policy. "'91 Although the court considered some of the same
factors the Mackey court addressed, the court did not require that each
factor be satisfied for the nonstatutory labor exemption to apply.92
87 See id. at 529.
88 See id. at 528.
89 Id. at 530 ("If the ABA and the Union had agreed in a collective agreement that
Caldwell should be paid a fixed wage, or could be discharged for any reason not specifi-
cally prohibited by a federal law such as Title VII, he could not have challenged that agree-
ment under the antitrust laws. Moreover . .. even in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement, Caldwell's right to challenge a discharge by the ABA had to be founded on
labor rather than antitrust law." (citation and footnote omitted)). The court also ad-
dressed Congress's choice to designate the NLRB as the agency responsible for deciding
employment issues rather than allowing federal courts, which may award treble damages
and attorney's fees, to adjudicate employment claims. See id. ("[I]f Caldwell is allowed to
proceed with the present action, employees in similar circumstances will either never re-
sort to the NLRB or will institute parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the
risk of inconsistent adjudications. Every employee who is locked out by a multiemployer
group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is discharged could
bring an antitrust action similar to Caldwell's. Clearly, Congress had no such intention.").
90 See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2004) ("We . . . have never re-
garded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-
statutory exemption."). Commentators disagree over whether the Clarett approach is a pos-
itive step towards a less rigid application of the factors discussed in Mackey or an impermis-
sible extension of the nonstatutory labor exemption in a direction that will ultimately harm
the collective bargaining process. Compare Case Comment, Antitrust Law-Nonstatutory La-
bor Exemption-Second Circuit Exempts NFL Eligibility Rule from Antitrust Scrutiny-Clarett v.
National Football League, 118 HAIv. L. REv. 1379, 1385 (2005) ("[A] bona fide bargaining
requirement for particular provisions during collective bargaining may defeat the policies
and justifications originally giving rise to the nonstatutory exemption."), withJocelyn Sum,
Note, Antitrust: Clarett v. National Football League, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 826 (2005)
("While courts such as the Second Circuit in Clarett may claim that such a broad exemption
is justified in order to protect the collective bargaining relationship, a look back at history
demonstrates that it in fact only promotes the breakdown of relations between unions and
employers.").
91 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
92 See id. at 139-42 (finding that eligibility rules are mandatory bargaining subjects
but that the nonstatutory labor exemption is not rendered inapplicable simply because the
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Instead, the court considered the totality of the circumstances, exam-
ining the eligibility rules and the circumstances surrounding their
adoption.9 3 Ultimately, the court determined that the eligibility rules
were mandatory bargaining subjects because "they have tangible ef-
fects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players."9 4
The court also found that the agreement regarding the eligibility rules
may affect prospective players who were not a party to the agree-
ment.95 Despite this finding, the court held that the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption could nonetheless still apply to the eligibility rules.9 6
Additionally, the court did not consider the fact that the rules were
not adopted through the collective bargaining process to. be disposi-
tive, especially because the rules were included in the NFL Constitu-
tion and were well known to the NFLPA during the negotiation
period.9 7
III
ANALYsIs
A. Threshold Issues
Before applying § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a court must
first address a number of threshold issues to determine whether the
agreement is subject to antitrust scrutiny. Specifically, a court must
find that an agreement exists between separate entities and that the
agreement has an effect on trade or commerce between the states.98
Additionally, the agreement must not be exempt from the antitrust
laws for other policy reasons.
The Personal Conduct Policy constitutes an agreement among
multiple entities-the thirty-two NFL teams-to adhere to the discipli-
nary sanctions that the NFL Commissioner decided upon and im-
agreement has some effect on parties outside the agreement or because the rules were not
bargained for through an arm's-length collective bargaining process).
93 See id.
94 See id. at 140.
95 See id. at 140-41.
96 See id. at 141 ("In the context of this collective bargaining relationship, the NFL
and its players union can agree that an employee will not be hired or considered for em-
ployment for nearly any reason whatsoever so long as they do not violate federal laws such
as those prohibiting unfair labor practices . . . .").
97 See id. at 142 ("The threat to the operation of federal labor law posed by Clarett's
antitrust claims is in no way diminished by Clarett's contention that the rules were not
bargained over during the negotiations that preceded the current collective bargaining
agreement.").
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States .. . is declared to be illegal."); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-71 (1984) (making clear that antitrust scrutiny
only applies to agreements between separate entities and that agreements between officers
of a single company, or a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary, do not warrant scrutiny
under the antitrust laws).
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posed. Although the NFL teams cooperate in a variety of ways to
ensure that the league runs smoothly and efficiently, the teams are
independently owned and operate, for the most part, as separate enti-
ties.99 Additionally, in previous cases involving the NFL, courts have
almost exclusively considered NFL teams as separate entities and sub-
ject to antitrust constraints. 0 0 Consequently, absent a dramatic
change in how the courts view the business organization of the NFL, a
reviewing court would likely consider the Personal Conduct Policy to
be an agreement among separate entities and subject to § 1.101
A court would also almost certainly find that the Personal Con-
duct Policy affects interstate commerce because the NFL supplies its
product to consumers across the country. Courts have long held that
professional sports leagues, including the NFL, engage in interstate
commerce,10 2 and the analysis of the Personal Conduct Policy should
not differ from past decisions.
99 See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976); see also CONSTITUTION AND
BYLAws OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 20, art. III, §§ 3.2-3.3 (detailing
the conditions for membership in the NFL, including that "[t]he member club shall be
held in a separate corporation, partnership, or trust[,] . . . the primary purpose of which
shall at all times be and remain the operation of a professional football team as a member
club of the League, which such primary purpose shall not be changed, and the only mate-
rial asset of which shall be the member club."). Although the NFL teams occasionally
divide revenue equally among the teams, this facet of the league has traditionally not inter-
fered with the teams being considered separate entities. See, e.g., id. art. X, § 10.3 ("All
regular season (and preseason network) television income will be divided equally among
all member clubs of the League regardless of the source of such income, except that the
member clubs may, by unanimous agreement, provide otherwise in a specific television
contract or contracts.").
100 See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010) ("Although NFL
teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate,
profit-maximizing entities . . . ."); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381,
1388-89 (9th Cir. 1984) ("While the NFL clubs have certain common purposes, they do
not operate as a single entity. NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corpora-
tion, but by the separate teams acting jointly."); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d
1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The NFL teams are separate economic entities engaged in a
joint venture."); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 878-79 (D. Minn. 1992) (noting that
both the Ninth and Second Circuits have "expressly rejected" the single entity defense).
101 Recently, in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that the NFL is not
categorically exempt from § I as a single entity where each team licenses its logo to a single
corporate entity and the corporate entity then jointly licenses the logos of each team. See
Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212-13, 2216-17; see also Michael McCann, Why American Nee-
dle-NFL Is Most Important Case in Sports Histoy, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM (Jan. 12, 2010,
11:33 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/
americanneedlev.nfl/index.html. .
102 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 n.19 ("It is undisputed that the NFL operates in inter-
state commerce."); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) ("The business of professional basketball as conducted by NBA and the NBA
teams on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and broadcast the
games for interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States within
the meaning of the Sherman Act.").
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Additionally, § 1 would not apply to the Personal Conduct Policy
if the Policy is subject to the nonstatutory labor exemption, which ex-
empts the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining from the anti-
trust laws. Despite the circuit split on assessing when to apply the
nonstatutory labor exemption, a court applying either of the prevail-
ing tests would not apply the nonstatutory labor exemption to the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy. Consequently, the Policy would be subject to
§ One.
The Mackey test, which the Eighth and Sixth Circuits adopt, sets
forth three factors that must be present for the nonstatutory labor
exemption to apply to a particular agreement. First, the agreement
must primarily affect "only the parties to the collective bargaining re-
lationship."103 Second, the agreement must concern a "mandatory
subject of collective bargaining." 104 Third, the agreement must be
"the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."105 In Mackey, the
Eighth Circuit made clear that an agreement must meet all three fac-
tors to qualify for the nonstatutory labor exemption.10 6 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has also adopted these factors as providing the correct analysis to
determine whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to an
agreement between a league and its players' association.107
Given previous application of the Mackey test in both the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits, neither court would find the NFL's Personal Con-
duct Policy to be the result of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. As
previously noted, the NFL Commissioner unilaterally imposed the
Personal Conduct Policy upon the NFL teams and the NFLPA.108 The
Players' Association and NFL have not engaged in any type of collec-
tive bargaining process regarding the terms of the Personal Conduct
Policy and have not attempted to amend the Collective Bargaining
Agreement to include the Policy.'0 9 Given these courts' strict inter-
pretation of the bona fide arm's-length bargaining requirement,
courts in either the Eighth or Sixth Circuit would almost certainly de-
termine that the NFL and the NFLPA did not adopt the Personal Con-
duct Policy as a result of bona fide collective bargaining.
103 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 616 (finding that although the Rozelle rule qualifies as a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, the nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply because the rule
was not adopted as a result of a bona fide arm's-length bargaining process).
107 SeeMcCourtv. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979). Although the
Sixth Circuit found that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied to an instance where
negotiations had failed, the court noted that the circumstances were very different from
the Mackey situation and that the resulting agreement was the product of "good faith,
ann's-length bargaining." See id. at 1203.
108 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 38.
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Additionally, the NFL's Personal Conduct Policy affects a large
number of people outside the collective bargaining relationship be-
tween the NFL and the NFLPA, including coaches, owners, officials,
and even independent contractors and consultants.o10 Accordingly,
given that the Personal Conduct Policy fails to meet two separate fac-
tors of the Mackey test-in that it was not adopted as a result of bona
fide collective bargaining and it affects many individuals outside the
collective bargaining relationship-it is likely that neither the Eighth
nor the Sixth Circuit would apply the nonstatutory labor exemption to
the Personal Conduct Policy, and the Policy would subsequently be
subject to antitrust scrutiny in both circuits.
Similarly, the Second Circuit would also likely determine that the
nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply to the Personal Conduct
Policy. Rather than adopting the Mackey test, the Second Circuit de-
veloped its own test to address the application of the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption. In Clarett v. NFL,"' the Second Circuit considered
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether applying "anti-
trust scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal la-
bor policy."'112 Though it considered many of the same factors
included in the Mackey test, the Second Circuit ultimately applied the
nonstatutory labor exemption to the NFL's eligibility rules despite the
facts that the rules affected individuals outside the Players' Association
and the NFL did not adopt the rules through a collective bargaining
process with the NFLPA." 3 Though these circumstances would not
have satisfied the Mackey test, the Second Circuit noted that eligibility
rules were well known to the NFLPA through the NFL Constitution
and Bylaws, and the NFLPA could have forced collective bargaining
regarding the eligibility rules if the Players' Association felt such a pro-
cess was necessary. 14 Additionally, as part of the collective bargaining
agreement, the NFLPA had agreed to waive any challenge to the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws." 5 Though the NFLPA and the NFL had not
gone through the collective bargaining process regarding the eligibil-
ity rules, the parties had indirectly addressed the rules at issue in
Clarett.
110 See NFL PERSONAL CONDucr Poucy, supra note 4, at 3.
I11 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
112 Id. at 138 (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
113 See id. at 140-42.
114 See id. at 142 ("The eligibility rules, along with the host of other NFL rules and
policies affecting the terms and conditions of NFL players included in the NFL's Constitu-
tion and Bylaws, were well known to the union, and a copy of the Constitution and Bylaws
was presented to the union during negotiations. Given that the eligibility rules are a
mandatory bargaining subject ... the union or the NFL could have forced the other to the
bargaining table if either felt that a change was warranted.").
115 See id.
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The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Personal
Conduct Policy differ significantly from the facts of the Clarett case. As
a result, the Second Circuit would probably not apply the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption to the Personal Conduct Policy, and the Policy
would be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Although the Personal Conduct
Policy probably constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing, the court would probably not consider this fact sufficient to apply
the nonstatutory labor exemption because the Policy has a clear effect
on the wages and working conditions of players affected by discipli-
nary measures. 1 6 As previously noted, Goodell imposed the Personal
Conduct Policy in 2008,117 two full years after both the latest revision
of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws and when the most recent Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement took effect. 118 Thus, unlike Clarett, where
the Players' Association knew of the eligibility rules during the collec-
tive bargaining process, the Personal Conduct Policy in its current
form did not even exist during the last round of collective bargaining
negotiations, and consequently, the Players' Association was not in a
position to force collective bargaining on the issue if it felt negotia-
tions were necessary. Finally, in contrast to the eligibility rules that
were included in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, the League's main
governing document, the Personal Conduct Policy, is an entirely sepa-
rate document that the Commissioner unilaterally set forth.119
Neither the NFLPA nor the NFL teams have ever formally assented to
the Personal Conduct Policy.120 Given the significant differences in
the underlying facts that distinguish the Personal Conduct Policy from
the situation surrounding the eligibility rules in Clarett, the Second
Circuit would probably determine that the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion should not apply to the Personal Conduct Policy, and the Policy
would therefore be subject to the antitrust laws.
The Personal Conduct Policy would thus meet the threshold re-
quirements necessary for § 1 to apply. Consequently, a court would
then proceed to a full antitrust analysis to determine whether the Pol-
icy in fact violates federal antitrust law or whether the procompetitive
effects of the Policy justify the agreement.12 1
116 See id. at 140 (finding that the eligibility rules "constitute a mandatory bargaining
subject because they have tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current
NFL players").
117 See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCr PoucY, supra note 4.
118 See CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWs OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 20;
CoLLEcrIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 5.
119 See supra Part I.B-C.
120 See supra Part I.C.
121 See supra Part II.A.
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B. Rule of Reason Analysis
As previously discussed, rather than applying the per se analysis
that courts typically apply to a boycott, a court examining the Personal
Conduct Policy would almost certainly apply a rule of reason analysis
to determine whether the Personal Conduct Policy violates antitrust
law. 122 Under a rule of reason analysis, a plaintiff challenging the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy under § 1 would have to establish a prima facie
case by demonstrating that the NFL teams have market power and
that the teams' agreement regarding the Personal Conduct Policy has
a net anticompetitive effect on the market.123 Here, the relevant mar-
ket definition would almost certainly be the labor market for profes-
sional football within the United States. Given this market definition,
a potential plaintiff could easily demonstrate the NFL's market power
because the NFL is the only elite employer of professional football
players in the United States, and consequently, it has monopoly power
over the relevant market. 2 4 Even if the court were to define the mar-
ket as professional football in North America or worldwide, the sec-
ond most prominent professional football league, the Canadian
Football League, refuses to employ any player suspended by the
NFL.'25 Given these facts, an examining court would easily find that
the NFL holds market power in the professional football labor market.
After demonstrating the NFL's market power, a plaintiff would
next have to show anticompetitive harm resulting from the Personal
Conduct Policy. Given the Commissioner's ability to suspend a player
from the NFL, potentially indefinitely, a plaintiff would probably al-
lege that the Personal Conduct Policy harms competition by prevent-
ing otherwise capable players from participating in professional
football.126 Additionally, by preventing eligible players from perform-
ing the service of competing in professional football games, the NFL
teams essentially exclude an eligible seller from the market. Finally, a
player's suspension harms consumers by restricting their ability to ex-
press a choice in which players to support and by lessening the quality
122 See id.
123 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
124 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 645-46; see also Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 126
(2004) (describing the NFL as "by far the most successful professional football league in
North America"). The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as "the power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition." See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
125 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 646.
126 See id. at 647; see also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand,
J., concurring) ("[O]ne of the oldest and best established [restraints of trade which is
unlawful at common law] is a contract which unreasonably forbids any one to practice his
calling.").
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of the service provided. 1 2 7 Though the NFL could question the
strength of these arguments, a court would probably find them suffi-
cient to demonstrate a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm.
After a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, the burden of proof
shifts to the NFL to provide a procompetitive justification for the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy by demonstrating that its procompetitive effects
outweigh its potentially anticompetitive effects.128 In setting forth
procompetitive justifications for the Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL
must demonstrate that the Policy actually improves economic compe-
tition within the professional football labor market.129 The NFL can-
not justify the Personal Conduct Policy by arguing that the Policy
contributes to social welfare by suspending NFL players who commit
crimes or engage in other types of wrongdoing.13 0
Despite these limitations, however, the NFL may justify the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy by arguing that, to protect the viability of the
joint venture, the teams who make up the league must be able to col-
lectively impose a meaningful disciplinary policy. Under this procom-
petitive justification, the NFL can persuasively argue that in order for
the teams in the league to viably produce the product of professional
football, they must be able to collectively agree on the qualities that
render a player ineligible to play for any team.131
It is necessary for the NFL teams to enact a disciplinary policy
collectively because, without the agreement of every team, the pur-
pose and effect of the policy would be diminished and perhaps even
completely negated. If the NFL teams are not permitted to collec-
tively agree to enforce a suspension that the Commissioner imposes,
no individual team has any incentive to adhere to the limitations of
the suspension. If one team decided individually to honor the suspen-
127 See Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1967) ("[T he
service supplied to the public by a professional football club is highly dependent upon the
ability of the players employed by the club, and a black-listing agreement . .. is, from the
point of view of the public, an impairment of competition as to the quality of the service
supplied, even though, as between player and club it is only a restriction on freedom to
employ.").
128 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
130 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986) ("The Federation is not
entitled to pre-empt the working of the market by deciding for itself that its customers do
not need that which they demand."); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 695-96 (1978) (holding that safety concerns do not justify an agreement between
competitors to refrain from competitive bidding); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d
658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("A restraint on competition cannot be justified solely on the basis
of social welfare concerns.").
131 Under this logic, the NFL could argue that the Personal Conduct Policy is an agree-
ment that "merely regulates, and . .. thereby promotes, competition." See Bd. of Trade of
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241,
243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("Every league or association must have some reasonable gov-
erning rules, and these rules must necessarily include disciplinary provisions.").
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sion while another did not, the first team runs the risk of competitive
players signing on with competing teams. Although the law requires
this type of individual decision making and risk assessment of typical
competitors, it does not require entities engaged in a joint venture to
risk their own success on their partners' cooperation. 13 2 Given the
necessity of securing each team's agreement to adhere to the Personal
Conduct Policy to ensure that the Policy has the desired effect, a court
should find that the procompetitive effect of allowing the NFL teams
to collectively set disciplinary rules to ensure that the product of pro-
fessional football remains viable outweighs the anticompetitive effect
on the few individuals who face commissioner suspensions or other
disciplinary measures.
CONCLUSION
Given the popularity of the NFL and the star status of profes-
sional athletes in American culture today, the NFL should be able to
set rules that address the growing number of disciplinary issues that
professional football teams face. In doing so, however, the NFL Com-
missioner and the NFL teams must tread carefully, ensuring that they
address disciplinary problems efficiently but also within the con-
straints of the law.
Outside the restrictions of the antitrust laws, the Personal Con-
duct Policy seems to be a positive change in the NFL. Given the swift
and harsh responses to recent criminal incidents involving NFL play-
ers, players will likely consider the possible ramifications of their ac-
tions before engaging in criminal behavior. Additionally, Goodell has
demonstrated reluctance to employ the particularly harsh penalty of
banishment, as exemplified through his choice to reinstate former
star quarterback Michael Vick after Vick's release from prison.133
Hopefully, the possibility of harsh punishments resulting from the
Personal Conduct Policy will deter athletes and others who associate
with the NFL from engaging in criminal behavior or otherwise sully-
ing the NFL's reputation and product.
Given the circumstances surrounding the NFL's adoption of the
Personal Conduct Policy, however, an affected player will eventually
challenge the Policy under the antitrust laws, alleging that the Policy
constitutes an unlawful agreement among competitors to boycott an
eligible seller from providing a service and practicing his profession.
132 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) ("[C]ourts must determine whether
the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is
ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business association, and thus
valid.").
133 See William C. Rhoden, After Reinstatement, Vick Has to Handle Teams and Public, N.Y.
TimEs, July 28, 2009, at B14.
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Although a potential plaintiff would likely be able to make out a
prima facie case and avoid summary disposition, an examining court
should find that the Personal Conduct Policy does not violate § 1 of
the Sherman Act. The policy does not violate § 1 because allowing
the NFL teams to collectively impose a disciplinary policy is the only
way to ensure the policy's effectiveness and thereby ensure the contin-
ued viability of the product of professional football. Allowing the NFL
teams to agree on reasonable constraints regarding a player's eligibil-
ity following a disciplinary violation will strengthen both the teams'
and the NFL's product, resulting in a procompetitive effect that satis-
fies the antitrust laws.
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